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DIVORCE: THE PLACE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
DEALING WITH MARITAL-DISCORD CASES
QUINTIN JOHNSTONE·
D IVORCE is one of the most disturbing problems of modern times.It is the subject of frequent comment by religious, governmental,
and academic leaders, and the number of articles on it in the press and
popular periodicals indicates great concern on the part of the general
public. Because divorce is a legal proceeding, many lay groups are prone
to hold the legal system-the law, lawyers, and the courts-responsible
for the problem and to believe that reforms in the law are the solution to
it. This article attempts to examine realistically the legal system's re-
sponsibility for divorce, both in the light of what it is doing and what it
can be expected to do.
Any adequate treatment of the subject requires a consideration of the
contributions that nonlegal groups can make toward easing the prob-
lems of marital discord. Nonlegal groups share divorce responsibility
with the legal system. They also may be able to achieve more than
courts and lawyers can in dealing with marital-discord matters. There
may be points where the legal system should withdraw its efforts in
favor of nonlegal alternatives, and there may be points where the most
effective action will require the joint efforts of the legal system and
nonlegal groups.
WHAT THE LEGAL SYSTEM DOES IN DIVORCE CASES
Courts and lawyers have much to do with problems of marital dis-
cord. These problems arise in many kinds of actions in which a wide
variety of relief is sought. The most common marital-discord actions
are those for divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody,
and nonsupport. The most common legal results sought are termination
of marital status, award of property and support, award of child cus-
tody, declaration of child-visitation rights, resumption of maiden name,
injunction against interference by one person with another, and crim-
inal penalties of fine and imprisonment.
From the viewpoint of society, as well as the legal profession, divorce
suits are the most important marital-discord cases dealt with by the
legal system. Their importance lies in their large volume and the effect
they have on the personal lives and property rights of the families in-
volved.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.
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Statistical data on the volume of divorce decrees entered in the United
States is fairly complete; but information about important details of
divorce litigation, such as the number of cases contested, dismissed, or
in which relief was denied, and the grounds alleged by the parties, is
fragmentary. Judicial statistics in the United States are generally very
poor. The Federal courts and the courts in a few states, including Kan-
sas, are exceptions to this. A uniform system of judicial statistics,
adopted by all states, would greatly further the efficient administration
of American courts.
The volume of divorces has increased rapidly in the United States
during the twentieth century. A peak was reached in 1946, from which
there has been a decided decline, l but the present rate is still probably in
excess of the pre-World War II rate, with about 350,000 to 400,000
divorces now granted each year.
Annulment accomplishes about the same objectives as divorce. In
states where divorce is exceptionally difficult or very slow, annulment is
often used instead. This is true in New York, where adultery is the sole
ground for divorce but where there are liberal grounds for annulment.
Annulment is also common in California, probably because the one-
year waiting period between an interlocutory and final decree is not
required in connection with it.
In most states, of which Oregon is typical, annulment is rare in com-
parison with divorce. In Oregon, during 1948, annulments amounted to
only 2.3 per cent of the total annulments and divorces granted; for each
annulment there were forty-two divorces.2
Divorce supplies the courts with one of their most prevalent classes
of litigation. During the years 1936 to 1950, between 34 and 62 per cent
of all cases filed annually in the circuit courts of Oregon were divorce
cases.3
What do courts and lawyers do in divorce cases? What procedure is
followed, what laws are applied, and what is usually accomplished in
divorce litigation?
The great majority of divorce cases are uncontested in court. In
Oregon, during recent years, only 4 to 7 per cent of the divorce cases
have been contested.4 If "contested cases" are considered as those in
1 Summary of Marriage and Divorce Statistics, 36 VITAL STATISTICS-SPECIAL
REPORTS no. 2 (June 5, 1951), issued by the National Office of Vital Statistics,
. Federal Security Agency.
2 Divorce and Annulment Statistics, 35 VITAL STATISTICS-SPECIAL REPORTS
no. 12 (Aug. 7, 1950), issued by the National Office of Vital Statistics, Federal
Security Agency.
3 These percentages are based on the published reports of judicial business ap-
pearing in the biennial reports of the secretary of state of the state of Oregon.
4 Ibid.
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which the defendant does more than appear or file an answer, the per-
centage of contests has been even smaller. In most divorce cases no
counsel even appears for the defendant. It is not unusual for defendants
to retain counsel who do not appear, but who negotiate with plaintiff's
counsel on various issues, such as property settlements and alimony.
The ordinary way of contesting a divorce is to deny the charges.
When a case is contested, there is likely to be a counterclaim requesting
that a divorce be granted to the defendant instead of to the plaintiff.
In most kinds of lawsuits, if the defendant does not contest, the plain-
tiff will be granted the relief asked for in his pleading without any evi-
dence being submitted to the court. This is not true of uncontested di-
vorce suits. When a divorce suit is uncontested, the plaintiff must pre-
sent to the court enough evidence to make out a prime-facie case. Not
until then can he get a final decree. The purpose of this requirement is
to increase the likelihood that divorces will be granted only in cases
that merit them. To this end the judge can observe the demeanor of
witnesses and ask questions.
An uncontested-divorce hearing usually lasts about ten minutes. It
is customary for the plaintiff and one or two corroborating witnesses
brought by the plaintiff to testify. The judge may ask a few questions,
particularly if there are children of the marriage, but vigorous examina-
tion does not take place. The defendant's misdeeds as recited by the wit-
nesses may be only mildly offensive--occasional name calling or a slap
in the face-and yet may make out the plaintiff's case. In states where
the grounds for divorce are very restricted, for example, New York,
perjury is reputedly commonplace in divorce hearings. The same is true
of evidence submitted on the question of domicile during migratory-
divorce proceedings. In New York, remote circumstantial evidence of
adultery is, as a matter of practice, acceptable as sufficient proof of adul-
tery.1i
There is a surprisingly large percentage of dismissals in divorce liti-
gation. This fact may have important implications for the reform of di-
vorce law. Statistics available indicate that the percentage of divorce-
case dismissals varies from 20 to 40 per cent of the total divorce cases
filed.6
Ii Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNIlLL L. Q. 303 (1950);
Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36 COL. L.
RJ>v. 1121 (1936).
6 Biennial reports of the secretary of state of the state of Oregon; Kansas J udi-
cial Council bulletins; ANNUAL RIlPORT, 1950, COURT OF DOMIlSTIC RIlLATIONS AND
JUV!lNILIl COURT, LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO; Missouri Marriage and Divorce Statis-
tics 1940-1947, 4 J. OF THIl Mo. BAR 36 (1948) ; Pokorny, "Friend 0/ the Court"
Aids Detroit Judges in Divorce Cases, 29 ]. AM. JUD. Soc'y 166 (1946) ; MAR-
SHALL AND MAY, THIl DIVORCIl COURT, vol. 2 (Ohio), p. 294 (1933).
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As surprising as the high percentage of divorce cases dismissed is the
extremely low percentage of divorce requests denied. Statistics on this
are exceptionally poor, but any divorce judge will admit that he rarely
denies a divorce. The Kansas Judicial Council issues accurate figures
on denials in the state of Kansas. These figures disclose that from 1937
to 1950 there was only one denial to every 171 divorces granted in the
state. During the last year for which statistics are available, there were
just 23 divorce denials in Kansas as compared with 4,697 divorces
granted.7
In addition to legally terminating the status of marriage, divorce de-
crees affect the property rights of the parties. Divorce ends the right of
one spouse to succeed to the property of the other upon death, including
intestate succession, widow's allowances, and dower. Divorce also ends
the obligation of one spouse to support the other, unless express pro-
vision for support is made in the divorce decree or settlement agree-
ment. But provisions for alimony, child support, and property division
are often included in divorce decrees.
Predivorce negotiation between spouses on matters affecting prop-
erty may be tedious and involved. But, when there is a large amount of
money or property at stake, this type of negotiation brings lawyers the
largest fees obtainable in divorce practice. Settlement agreements be-
tween spouses as to property, alimony, and support, even when made
in contemplation of a divorce, are not considered illegal collusion.
Child custody is another question with which divorce litigation is fre-
quently concerned. Almost one-half of all divorce cases involve parents
with minor children.s It is usual for the courts to make custody awards
in such cases, but sometimes an award is not made because no request
is made by the parties or the children are out of the state and the court
has no jurisdiction over them.
Actually child custody is seldom an uncertain issue in divorce cases.
The uniform American pattern is to award the children to the mother,
except under very unusual circumstances such as where the mother has
deserted the family and her whereabouts are unknown, or where she
does not want the children, or where she wants the children but, be-
cause she has abused them in the past or because of immoral conduct on
her part in the past, she is not considered a proper person to bring them
7 KAN. JUD. COUNCIL BULL. (Oct. 1951) p. 102.
S ANNUAL REPORT, 1950, COURT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND JUVENILE COURT,
LUCAS COUNTY, OHIO, 31. MARSHALL AND MAY, THE DIVORCE COURT, vol. 1
(Maryland), p. 69 (1932); vol. 2 (Ohio), p. 96 (1933). A study of divorces in
Multnomah County, Oregon showed that 61 per cent of the cases involved child-
less couples. Two earlier national studies showed about the same thing. Bee, A
Partial Analysis of 2368 Divorces Granted in Multnomah County, Oregon, During
1942, 17 REStARCH STUDIES OF THE STATE COLI.l':Gt OF WASHINGTON 18 (1949).
HeinOnline -- 31 Or. L. Rev. 301 1951-1952
1952] MARITAL-DISCORD CASES 301
Up.9 If both parents are adjudged unqualified to care for their children,
the court may award them to some third person.
Although there are variations among the states in the legal grounds
that may be alleged for divorce, almost all· states permit divorce for
adultery, cruelty, desertion, habitual drunkenness, and nonsupport. The
overwhelming percentage of divorces are sought and granted on grounds
of cruelty or desertion. Nationally these two grounds accounted for 79
per cent of the cases in 1928,10 and 83 per cent of them in 1939.11 A
. study by Professor Lawrence S. Bee shows that cruelty and desertion
accounted for 98 per cent of the Multnomah County, Oregon divorces
in 1942 ;12 and in 1948,87 per cent of all Oregon divorces were granted
for cruelty, and 11 per cent for desertion.13 Adultery is seldom alleged
in states that permit cruelty and desertion as grounds. In 1948, the
number of divorces granted for adultery in selected states also permit-
ting divorce·for cruelty and desertion were as follows: Oregon, one;
South Dakota, six; Wisconsin, sixteen; Iowa, thirty-four; and New
Hampshire, seventy-one.14 Grounds such as insanity, impotency, and
conviction of a felony are seldom invoked.
Fault is the basic tenet of Anglo-American divorce law as declared in
statutes and judicial opinions. A divorce is granted only if the de-
fendant has been at fault and has committed some serious acts of mis-
conduct toward the plaintiff. If the plaintiff has also been at fault, then
there is no divorce.
The idea of fault is under serious attack today. First, it is claimed that
basing divorce on guilt and punishment has proven harmful to family
stability. This is one of the assumptions under which the Interprofes-
sional Commission on Marriage and Divorce Laws" sponsored by the
American Bar Association, is proceeding.15 Second, it is generally rec-
·ognized that the grounds alleged in divorce suits are seldom the real
reasons for marriages breaking up. At best they are symptoms of basic
causes. More often they are predicated on trivial, meaningless incidents
that can be squeezed into one of the legal grounds, or they are substan-
tiated by grossly distorted or completely fabricated evidence having
little or no relation to the truth. Third, the affirmative fault defenses to
9 Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721
(1944).
10 CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OJ! DIVORCE 38 (1932).
11 Divorce Statistics, 17 VITAL STATISTICs-SPECIAL REPORTS no. 25 (June 9,
1943), issued by U. S. Bureau of Census.
12 Bee, supra note 8.
13 Source cited note 2 supra.
14 Ibid.
15 OUTLINE OJ! THE RESEARCH PROGRAM OJ! THE INTERPROJ!ESSIONAL COM-
MISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS (mimeographed).
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divorce suits--collusion, condonation, and recrimination-are seldom
exerted although evidence to support them probably exists in a major-
ity of cases. The idea of fault is meaningless if the evidence does not
accurately show who is really at fault.
Many lawyers feel that divorce practice is less respectable than most
phases of law practice.16 This attitude is most widely held in the large
eastern cities; and many lawyers there will not take divorce cases. An
occasional lawyer will be found in small towns who avoids divorce cases
for the same reason. This feeling that divorce is a somewhat dirty busi-
ness is due to the perjury existing in divorce cases, the hypocrisy char-
acteristic of modern divorce trials in which legal rules and standards are
first invoked and then ignored, and the unethical solicitation and collu-
sion engaged in by some big-city divorce attorneys.
No lawyers, with a few exceptions in large cities, have practices in
which a majority of their time is spent on divorce cases. But in every
city over 50,000 population, a few lawyers, maybe only two or three,
have a far greater amount of divorce business than has the average
lawyer.
The bench is much more specialized in the domestic-relations field
than is the bar. In small counties there is only one judge for the general
court of first instance, and he hears all the divorce cases in that county.
In large counties, the trend is to assign one or more judges exclusively
to domestic-relations and family matters, of which divorce cases make up
the largest proportion.
It is not uncommon to find judges who dislike hearing divorce cases.
They know that a great amount of fraud and deception takes place in
the courtroom; and they also know that there is nothing constructive
that they can do about it. Divorce cases are frustrating and somewhat
degrading to the bench. They are also repetitiously dull. Many judges
avoid them if they can.
,Divorce is an important institution, but how much influence and con-
trol does the legal system actually exercise over it? Divorce proceedings
are largely rituals by which spouses can end the marriage relationship.
The most important factor in divorce is the decision by both spouses
that divorce is desirable. An express understanding may be reached by
the spouses, or the defendant spouse may decide that there is no hope of
reviving the relationship and that there is hence no point in attempting to
block the other's decision to secure a divorce. As long as both spouses
want a divorce, and judicial proceedings to accomplish that end are
pushed, the legal system will grant a divorce decree. The vast body of
16 For the efforts made by one local bar association to raise standards of prac-
tice in divorce cases after the county had been accused of being a divorce mill, see
Chattanooga Divorce Report, 19 TENN. L. REV. 944 (1947).
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substantive and procedural divorce law is no bar. Even in the rare cases
where an uncontested divorce suit results in a denial, the plaintiff can
always succeed by amending his pleadings, waiting a few months, and
refiling in the same court, or by starting a new suit in a different county
or a different state. Nor is there any substantial difference in this re-
spect between cases with contested and uncontested trials. Defendants
in contested divorce trials are not motivated by the expectation that suc-
cess will result in a resumption of normal marriage relations. The mo-
tives are to force better property, alimony, support, or custody arrange-
ments than can otherwise be obtained.
If the spouses' decisions are all-important in the issue of divorce, do
courts, lawyers, or the law have any influence in shaping these decisions?
The answer is some but not much. It is not uncommon for lawyers and
judges to try to reconcile the parties. This works occasionally. The fact
that litigation is necessary to end a marriage also influences some
spouses. The notoriety and emotional strain of divorce proceedings de-
ter same from lightly entering marriage or filing for divorce and cause
some divorce litigants to reconcile their differences even without pres-
sure from a judge or lawyer.
Although the influence of the legal system is very limited on the ques-
tion whether or not parties shall be divorced, its influence in divorce
cases is substantial in other respects. It frequently and effectively per-
forms a vital function in establishing and enforcing financial and child-
custody rights between divorcing spouses. These are the points in di-
vorce proceedings where the real disagreements between litigants exist.
It is here that the legal system exercises real control.
The substantive law of divorce has another influence that is generally
ignored, but which may help to explain the survival of present legal
divorce grounds and defenses in the law. The substantive law of divorce
is based on standards of marriage conduct that are generally accepted
in our society. The divorce law helps to perpetuate these standards by
educating the public as to what they are and by giving them the dignity
of legal authority.
THE REAL REASONS FOR DIVORCE
The real reasons for divorce are of great importance to a currently
much-discussed divorce reform, the family court. The primary reason
for divorce is marital discord. Many spouses just cannot get along with
one another in the close relationship of marriage. A great deal of re-
search and speculation has been done on the reasons for marital discord.
The conclusions on this question vary depending upon the field of in-
quiry.
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In psychology and psychiatry, emphasis is placed on the basic per-
sonality structure of the individual. In sociology, emphasis is on the in-
fluence of social forces and institutions on family disorganization,17
The complexity of modern industrial society is responsible for many
present-day evils as well as many things that we consider to be good.
Life today is complicated, uncertain, and changeable. There is great
variety among individual people in how they earn a living, in their rec-
reation, in their religious affiliations, education, and social status. This
variety has been accentuated in the United States by the heterogeneous
racial and cultural background of the population. The freedom to mix
with one another that different groups have had and the process of cul-
tural amalgamation that has always characterized American life have
contributed to American tensions. Our population is also very mobile
geographically and between jobs. These elements of change and variety
and cultural amalgamation increase the chances of mismating in mar-
riage and the growing apart of husbands and wives after marriage. Fre-
quent or severe changes imposed by a complex world make continued
adjustments to marriage impossible for many spouses, even for many
who were adjusted early in marriage. Moving from farm to city, from
one section of the country to the other, the wife getting a job, the hus-
band going into the military service, the children growing up and mov-
ing from the parental home-changes of this sort can cause discord that
leads to divorce.IS
The relative rate of personality change may differ between sponses
after marriage. This is most likely with couples who marry when under
twenty. Marital tension is often the result.I9
The family as a center for economic production, recreation, religious
practice, education, and care and development of children is less im-
portant than formerly. Competing and supplementing institutions for
performing these functions have grown in importance. But, on the other
hand, the family has become relatively more important in supplying the
emotional needs of affection, prestige, and self-respect. Human beings
have these emotional needs; and it is increasingly difficult to satisfy
them, except in the family, because of the increasingly impersonal, lim-
ited, and casual nature of the relationships between people outside of
17 Good general works on the sociology of marital discord are ELLIOTT AND MllR-
RILL, SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION (3d ed. 1950) ; BURGllSS AND LOCKll, THll FAMILY
(1945) ; MOWRllR, FAMILY DISORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1939) ; MOWRllR, DISORGANI-
ZATION, PllRSONAL AND SOCIAL (1942) ; TRUXAL AND MllRRILL, THE FAMILY IN
AMERICAN CULTURll (1947); NIMKOFF, MARRIAGll AND THll FAMILY (1947);
LICHTllNBllRGllR, DIVORCll (1931).
IS For a discussion of the historical changes in American marriage and the
reasons for them, see Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 33 COL. L. REv. 249
(1933).
19 Ml!AD, MALl! AND FEMALl! 362 (1949).
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the family. Some scholars think that providing for emotional needs is
the principal function of the modern family.20 But the emotional rela-
tions of human beings, particularly between husband and wife, are in-
clined to be volatile and fluctuating. So this increased significance of
the family as an emotional·unit, because it is concerned with such an un-
certain and irrational aspect of human behavior, has increased marital
instability.
There seems to be a correlation between the size and kinship of those
living in the family unit and the existence of marital discord. Divorce
and discord are more frequent when families are doubled up, and espe-
cially when a parent of the husband or wife is living in the family. Con-
versely, there seems to be less discord and divorce in families where
there are children. The place in which a family lives and its social class
also have an effect on marital discord and divorce.
The personality21 of every human being is in part the result of the age
in which he lives, the kind of family in which he has grown up, and the
kinds of communities in which he has re~ided. Physiological and bio-
logical factors also influence the nature of human personality. The re-
sult is that human beings differ greatly in personality characteristics,
and hence respond with much variation to such interpersonal relation-
ships as marriage. .
Some individuals have personality characteristics that make adjust-
ment to any marriage difficult or even impossible. These characteristics
are deep-seated; and the individuals possessing them are usually un-
aware of their existence, scope, or cause. They include such matters as
extreme selfishness; hatred for one parent that will be transferred to a
spouse; great affection for one parent that prevents the giving of affec-
tion to a spouse; a great desire to be mistreated and defeated; and un-
developed or homosexual attitudes toward sex. Sometimes these indi-
viduals behave so abnormally that they are institutionalized as insane or
criminals. Sometimes they become a1coholics.22 More commonly they
are normal enough to stay out of trouble with the law but have great
20 TRUXAL AND MERRILL, THE FAMILY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 390-396 (1947).
21 The term "personality" has many shades of meaning, but in this article it is
used to mean the patterns of reaction of individual persons. For the various mean-
ings given to the word "personality," see Sapir, Personality in 12 ENCYC. Soc. SCI.
85 (1937).
22 Alcoholics are less likely to marry than nonalcoholics; but, when they do
marry, or when alcoholism develops after marriage, extreme marital discord is
almost inevitable. One study of male inebriates who had been arrested by the police
showed that this group had been divorced twelve times as often and separated six
times as often as men in the same age group in the general population. Bacon:
Excessive Drinking and the Family in ALCOHOL, SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 223, 229
(1945).
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difficulty in maintaining close personal associations with others, either
in or out of marriage.
In recent years a group of sociologists has been inquiring into the
kinds of people that are the most likely to be failures in marriage. Stress
in their studies is placed not only on the individual's characteristics but
on the combinations of individuals that make for unsuccessful mar-
riages.23 Happiness and permanence are the major tests of marital suc-
cess or failure. These studies indicate that certain readily observed, su-
perficial indications of personality make for unhappiness in marriage:
pessimistic temperament, domineering behavior, hypercritical and in-
considerate attitudes toward others, lack of self-confidence, emotional
self-sufficiency, frequent loneliness and touchiness. Some nonperson-
ality factors were also shown to have an effect on marriage: age at
marriage-teen-age marriages are failures in an unusually large num-
ber of cases; occupation-men who are unskilled laborers, travel ex-
tensively in their work, and salesmen are particularly unsuccessful in
marriage, as are persons with irregular-work records before marriage;
family background-persons from broken homes or homes with con-
siderable discord are bad risks, a fact indicating that marital discord
tends to perpetuate itself through the children; education-the less for-
mal education, the less chance of success in marriage. Differences be-
tween spouses that make for marriage failure include the following: age
(husband more than ten years older than his wife) ; social class; family
background; education; substantial differences in values and objectives
in life; lack of common interests, including recreation and religion; and
lack of joint participation in activities related to common interests. Lack
of emotional and sexual adjustment between spouses often exists even
though neither spouse is abnormal, and when each might readily make
successful adjustments to other persons in a marriage relationship.
Maladjustment in sexual relations has been found to exist in almost all
cases of marital discord.24
Those who oppose divorce or the making of divorce more easy be-
lieve that a major reason for marital discord is that husbands and wives
do not make sufficient efforts to adjust to marriage. These people think
that the sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists have ignored the
force that human will and religious faith can have and should have in
solving marital problems. They argue that the availability of divorce, or
23 These studies are reported on in BURGESS AND COTTRELL, PREDICTING SUC-
CESS OR FAILURE IN MARRIAGE (1939); TERMAN, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN
MARITAL HAPPINESS (1938); LOCKE, PREDICTING ADJUSTMENT IN MARRIAGE
(1951); BURGESS AND LoCKE, THE FAMILY c. 15 (1945); Burgess, Predictive
Methods and Family Stability, 272 ANNALS 47 (1950).
24 FOLSOM, THE FAMILY AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 437 (1943); LICHTEN-
BERGER, DIVORCE 383 (1931).
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at least easy divorce, makes for continued marital discord and divorce
by allowing spouses to terminate their marriages rather than to face and
solve their marital problems. This position has some merit, especially
in the early years of marriage. But it is doubtful if eliminating divorce
or materially tightening up on the law of divorce would make things
better. There still would be almost as many marriages that would be fail-
ures because the spouses were unhappy, discontented, and destructive of
one another and their children. And problems such as desertion, non-
support, promiscuity, and illegitimate relationships would increase.
What is more, like it or not, the institution of divorce is now so well
established in our society that its elimination in the foreseeable future is
inconceivable.
Although marital discord is the primary reason for divorce, it is not
the only reason. Nor is divorce inevitable where great discord exists.
Adherence to religious beliefs and a deep ethical feeling that divorce is
morally wrong prevent some divorces. So do fear of family and com-
munity criticism and fear of financial insecurity. Some families are held
together by a sense of responsibility to the children of the marriage.
Some spouses are able to put up with a lot and still remain married;
they have a high tolerance to discord. The absence of these beliefs, fears,
personality traits, and the absence of children, increase the likelihood of
divorce when excessive marital discord exists.
A significant reason for the increase in divorce is the change in atti-
tude concerning it. It is far more acceptable than formerly; and it is less
frequently considered evil and a sin.
Changes in the divorce law have probably had less effect on the vol-
ume of divorces than is often thought. Of course, permitting absolute
divorce where it formerly was not permitted, as South Carolina re-
cently did, has a tremendous effect; but it is less important if liberal
annulment and divorce a mensa et thoro were permitted before the
change. Making divorce a judicial rather than a legislative function also
has tended to increase the number of divorces. So apparently has the
addition of the grounds of desertion and cruelty in states where adultery
was formerly the sole ground.25 Making divorce financially more avail-
able has tended to increase its volume.
NONLEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS DEALING WITH
MARITAL-DISCORD PROBLEMS
Marital discord and the problems caused by it are the concern of
25 In England the divorce rate has multiplied by ten since the grounds for di-
vorce were increased in 1938. Mace, Family Life in Britain Since the First World
War, 272 ANNALS 179 (1950).
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many groups other than lawyers and judges. The legal system has no
monopoly over marital-discord cases. In fact, lawyers and judges are
more and more often seeking assistance in marital cases from nonlegal
specialists.
Spouses who are having trouble adjusting to one another, and fami-
lies in which disorganizing influences are apparent, may receive advice
and counsel from various n'onlegal sources. Some sources are available
only to those who voluntarily seek assistance. Others force themselves
on to discordant families.
Besides lawyers, those who are most frequently sought out for advice
in cases of marital discord are clerics, physicians, psychiatrists, and mar-
riage counselors. The advice of ministers and priests is usually based
on religious doctrine and common sense. In cases of religiously devout
persons, this kind of counseling is frequently successful. There is a
growing trend to give theological students and ministers some back-
ground knowledge in sociology and psychology as they are related to
marital discord ;26 but so far this has had little influence on clerical post-
marriage counseling.
Physicians do the most effective counseling in marriage-discord
cases if there is an organic physical defect related to the problem. Phy-
sicians can also give good common-sense advice. Like ministers, they
are respected persons, and they can look at the personal problems of
others in an impartial manner.
The psychiatrists approach marital-discord problems by trying to
discover the conscious and unconscious personality characteristics of
the spouses that are causing friction between them. This involves a diffi-
cult and highly skilled technique, and is done by observation and inter-
rogation in lengthy interview or conference sessions between the psy-
chiatrist and the patient. These sessions are usually held with only one
spouse at a time. It is not unusual for one psychiatrist to work with one
spouse, and another one with the other spouse. The psychiatrist's first
problem is to ascertain the personality factors that are causing the mari-
tal difficulty and the events in the person's past experience that have
created these factors. This ordinarily takes several sessions of an hour
or so each. After the diagnosis, treatment consists in bringing to the
patient an awareness of and insight into his personality characteristics
and their relation to the marital conflict. Then an effort is made to re-
educate the patient in the light of this new insight. The psychiatrist may
make suggestions and attempt subtle persuasion. The aim of this whole
process is to relieve the patient's anxieties, to help him realize his de-
26 Wood, The Training of Ministers for Marriage and Family Counseling, 12
MARRIAGS AND FAMILY LIVING 46 (1950); NASH, EDUCATION FOR CHRISTIAN
MARRIAGS (1939).
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sires, and to assist him in adjusting to the inevitable facts in his life. So
far as the marriage is concerned, it may mean establishing a firmer,
more workable relationship; or it may mean adjustment to dissolution
of that relationship.
Many persons who have difficulty adjusting to marriage also have
difficulty adjusting to other interpersonal relationships. They may fail
as parents, at earning a living, and in their recreational associations. All
of their failures may stem from the same personality factors. Successful
psychiatric treatment in the marriage sphere may require improvement
in these other relationships. The average length of time required for
effective diagnosis and treatment in marriage cases is four to five
months if the psychiatrist sees the patient once a week.
Psychiatry is a specialized branch of medicine, and nearly all psychia-
trists are doctors of medicine. The fees of psychiatrists in private prac-
tice are high, which means that when in private practice they are avail-
able in marital-discord cases only. to the middle- and upper-income
classes.
A limited knowledge of psychiatry is made use of by several profes-
sions: nursing, social work, and a new profession usually known as
marriage counseling. Those who consider themselves professional mar-
riage counselors are a miscellaneously trained group that spend a sub-
stantial amount of working time in advising persons who are having
marital difficulties.27 Some marriage counselors have been trained as
physicians, some as psychiatrists, some as psychologists, some as psy-
chiatric social workers, some as sociologists, and some have no particu-
lar training but think they have a flair for unraveling marriage problems.
Personality analysis in relation to marriage is the general approach of
them all, although there are variations in skill and method.28 Marriage
counseling has been distinguished from psychiatry by its lesser depth of
observation and explanation. In marriage counseling the "deep uncon-
scious" is avoided, and explanations are limited to "conscious and near-
conscious" materia1.29
The problem of minimum standards is a serious one in the marriage-
counseling field. What training should be required of marriage counse-
lors and what conduct prohibited ?30 The field is now so nebulous that
27 On marriage counseling, see CUBtR, MARRIAGt COUNStLING PRACTICt
(1948); GOLDSTtIN, MARRIAGt AND FAMILY COUNStLING (1945) ; MUDD, THt
PRACTICt OF MARRIAGt COUNStLING (1951); GROvtS, MARRIAGt AND FAMILY
LIFt c. 18 (1942) ; THoRNt, PRINCIPLtS OF PERSONALITY COUNstLING (1950).
28 Two case studies that indicate the methods used by marriage counselors are
reported on in 13 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIVING 29 and 52 (1951).
29 Mudd and Preston, The Contemporary Status of Marriage Counseling, 272
ANNALS 102 (1950).
30 Pearl, Are We Developing a Profession?, 12 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIVING
128 (1950).
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charlatans and well-meaning incompetents can set themselves up as
professional counselors. There is considerable support for plans to
license marriage counselors as members of a separate occupation. If
mandatory minimum standards were established requiring a good
working knowledge of psychiatric methods, the number of those who
now could qualify would be restricted to the psychiatrists, some psy-
chiatric social workers, some clinical psychologists, and very few others.
The medical profession and the marriage counselors are in conflict as
to how far marriage counselors should be permitted to go in using psy-
chiatric techniques without being licensed to practice medicine.31 To
avoid criticism and to increase the accuracy of their work, some mar-
riage counselors frequently consult with psychiatrists concerning their
cases. They also refer their more difficult cases to psychiatrists.
The number of marriage counselors in private practice who regularly
take marital-discord cases is small. In Oregon, exclusive of psychi-
atrists, there are not more than three or four of them, and they do coun-
seling only as a part-time side line. Oregon also has about a dozen psy-
chiatrists in private practice, and all of them do some marriage counsel-
ing. In most larger American cities there are family-service agencies,
frequently community-ehest supported, that do marriage counseling.
The best known of these are located in New York, Philadelphia, and
Los Angeles.32 One was to be opened in Portland, Oregon during the
fall of 1951.
The success of marriage counseling is difficult to estimate because of
the uncertainty as to criteria and the lack of follow~up data. In a prelim-
inary study made at the Marriage Council of Philadelphia, it was con-
cluded that 58 per cent of a 72-case sample showed "positive move-
ment" during counseling.33
A good marriage counselor using a psychiatric approach can handle
only a small number of cases if he is trying not only to diagnose but
build a workable adjustment. Devoting full time to this, the case load
should not be more than 25 to 40 cases if the counselor is working with
only one of the spouses in each marriage. The annual number of cases
disposed of by a counselor with such a case load would be 75 to 125. It
would be only half as many if he is counseling both spouses. With good
group therapy, the volume can be increased somewhat.
31 Stokes, Legal Status of the Marriage Counselor, 13 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
LIVING 113 (1951); Ellis, Legal Status of the Marriage Counselor: A Psycholo-
gist's View, id. at 116.
32 Stone, Marriage Education a'id Marriage Counseling in the United States,
11 MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIVING 38 (1949); GROVES, CONSERVING MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY 120 (1944) (lists marriage-counseling agencies); Popenoe,
Family Consultation Service, 17]. Soc. HYGIENE 309 (1931).
38 Mudd and Preston, supra note 29.
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In addition to marriage counseling of discordant spouses, there is an-
other major approach to problems of marriage discord that the legal
system does not participate in. This is education for marriage. Most of
it is premarital education and is carried on through formal courses
given in high schools and colleges. Some marriage-education classes are
also held by church groups and parent-teacher associations, and the
family-service agencies conduct premarital information and training
programs in addition to their counseling on marital discord.
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL DEVICES AVAILABLE FOR ACHIEVING
OBJECTIVES IN THE FIELD OF MARITAL DISCORD
Many suggestions have been made for changing the law so as to solve
or alleviate marital-discord problems. The important differences among
important groups as to what society's objectives should be in relation
to marital discord help account for the number and variety of these sug-
gestions. The suggestions vary in their chances of being adopted. Some
have no chance of ever being adopted. Some have a chance of acceptance
into the law at some time in the distant future and perform now a valu-
able function of stimulating thought about the nature of domestic prob-
lems and their solutions. Some stand a good chance of acceptance in
the immediate future.
The best way of determining what suggestions fall in this latter group
is to observe the changing and growing points in the law. In our federal
system, the law over which the states have jurisdiction develops by one
state trying an idea and other states copying it if it is well received
in the first state. This is true of legislation as well as case law.34 In the
field of domestic relations, most of the current suggestions for law re-
form have been tried out by one or more states. If the ideas have been
successful where tried, there is a strong possibility that they will be
workable elsewhere.
The most frequently suggested change in divorce law has, at least
until recently, been to alter the grounds for divorce. The trend has been
to increase the number of grounds; but ineffectual pressure to reduce
the number has also been brought to bear. In New York, where adul-
tery is still the sole ground, strong efforts have been made to add cruelty
and desertion. Since 1937, several Anglo-American jurisdictions have
greatly liberalized their formerly strict laws as to grounds for divorce.35
34 Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IOWA L. Rllv. 41 (1937).
35 South Carolina, which formerly permitted no absolute divorce, in 1949
enacted a statute allowing absolute divorce for adultery, desertion for one year,
physical cruelty, and habitual drunkeness. S. C. Acts 1949, nfl. 137. Prior to 1935,
absolute divorce could be secured in the District of Columma only for adultery.
Since 1935, it has been available for two-years desertion, five-years separation,
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This leaves New York and several of the Canadian provinces as the
only important common-law jurisdictions retaining adultery as the ex-
clusive ground for absolute divorce.
Considerable controversy has centered on two other advocated
grounds for divorce: incompatibility and the consent of the spouses.
New Mexico and Alaska permit incompatibility as a ground. There is
no statute in this country which expressly provides for divorce if,
without more, the husband and wife consent to it.36 But sixteen states
and the District of Columbia have statutory provisions making separa-
tion for from two to ten years a ground for divorce.37 In some of these
jurisdictions, the fact of separation for the required period is all that is
necessary. Fault, collusion, and recrimination are immaterial on the
issue of divorce ;38 so the parties may agree that they want a divorce and
separate with this in mind and yet their rights to a divorce under the
statute will not be impaired. In fact, under the Maryland and District
of Columbia statutes, the separation must be voluntary and based on an
agreement of the parties for the separation ground of divorce to apply.39
Permitting divorce for incompatibility or by consent of the spouses
eliminates much of the hypocrisy from modern divorce law by bring-
and conviction of a felony, in addition to adultery. D. C. CODe sec. 16-403 (1940).
By the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937, England added three-years desertion,
cruelty, and insanity as grounds for absolute divorce. 1 EDW. VIII and 1 Geo. VI,
c. 57, sec. 2. Prior to this act, adultery had been the sole ground.
86 In Japan, divorce by agreement of the spouses is legally permitted. The
agreements are validated by recording them at a government registration office.
Most divorces follow this procedure. Appleton, The New Family Courts of
Japan, 30 Focus 85 (1951). A similar system of easy divorce formerly existed in
the Soviet Union. Application by one or both spouses to a registry bureau was
all that was necessary. Even a de facto divorce received the same legal recognition
as a registered divorce. But this system was replaced in 1944-45 by a system of
strict judicial divorce. Berman, Soviet Family Law, 56 YALe L. J. 26,45 (1946);
Coser, Some Aspects of Soviet Family Policy, 56 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY (1951).
Consensual divorce is permitted in Sweden after court-authorized legal separation
for one year and after mediation by a neutral person has failed to effect a recon-
ciliation. Segerstedt and Weintraub, Marriage and Divorce in Sweden, 272 AN-
NALS 185 (1950).
87 These statutes are cited and discussed in Note, Separation for a Period of
Years as Grounds for Divorce, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rev. 705 (1949). For an argument
in favor of making divorce "decent and logical" by having only one ground for di-
vorce, separation for two years, see Walker, Ot,r Present Divorce Muddle: A
Suggested Solution, 35 A. B. A. J. 457 (1949).
88 Clemens v. Clemens, 143 F. 2d 24 (D. C. Cir. 1944) ; Young v. Young, 207
Ark. 36, 178 S. W. 2d 944 (1944); Sandlin v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S. W. 2d
635 (1942); Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S. W. 2d 132 (Tex. 1949), Recent De-
cisions, 48 MICH. L. Rev. 125 (1949); Annot., 166 A. L. R. 498 (1947); Annot.,
170 A. L. R. 1076 (1947); Comment, Divorce: Statutory Abolition of Marital
Fault, 35 CALIF. L. Rev. 99 (1947); Note, Separation for a Period of Years as
Grounds for Divorce, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV. 705 (1949).
89 Butler v. Butler, 154 F. 2d 203 (D. C. Cir. 1946) ; Campbell v. Campbell,
174 Md. 229, 198 Atl. 414 (1938).
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ing the legal grounds closer to the realities of marital disintegration.
But it also permits easy divorce as a matter of legally declared principle.
And when consensual divorce is allowed, it is a formally admitted sur-
render by the state of authority to decide whether or not a marriage
shall be terminated.
Some states permit divorce for incurable insanity, impotency, convic-
tion of a felony, and undisclosed pregnancy by another at the time of
marriage. These grounds exist in only a small percentage of cases; but,
when they do exist, a normal, successful marriage is unlikely. Sporadic
efforts are made to adopt them as grounds for divorce in other states.<to
At least three states expressly give the courts discretion in deciding
whether or not to grant a divorce if certain grounds exist.41 This discre-
tion idea has been extended much farther in criminal and juvenile cases.
It is possible that it may be extended more generally in divorce cases.42
The substantial differences between states in grounds for divorce is
disturbing to laymen. Lawyers are concerned with the uncertain legal
effect of migratory divorces that has developed from the Williams
Cases43 and their successors. The result has been suggestions for Fed-
eral and uniform divorce laws.44 Beginning in 1923, Senator Capper
regularly introduced legislation to amend the Constitution so as to per-
mit Federal marriage and divorce statutes, but with no success.45 Ef-
forts to secure uniform legislation on divorce matters have been disap-
pointing. A uniform marriage and divorce act was drafted and has been
adopted by three states, Delaware and New Jersey in 1907 and Wiscon-
sin in 1909; a uniform divorce jurisdiction act has been adopted by
only one state, and that state has repealed it ;46 a uniform divorce recog-
40 Insanity has recently been added as a ground for divorce in the following
states: Kentucky, Ky. Acts 1950, c. 162; Nebraska, NJ>B. RJ>v. STAT. sec. 42-301
(Supp. 1947) ; North Carolina, N. C. Session Laws 1945, c. 755, as amended by
N. C. Sessions Laws 1949, c. 264.
41 Discretion in the court to grant a divorce if the parties have lived separate
and apart for three years, NJ>v. COMPo LAWS sec. 9467.06 (Supp. 1931-41) ; if the
parties have lived separate and apart for ten years, R. I. GJ>N. LAWS c. 416, sec. 3
(1938) ; discretion in the court to refuse a divorce if the parties are equally in the
wrong, KAN. GJ>N. STAT. sec. 60-1506 (1949).
<t2 Professor Bradway favors such an extension. Bradway, The Myth of the
Innocent Spouse, 11 TULANJ> L. RJ>v. 377, 393 (1937).
43 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
44 Franklin, The Dilemma of Migratory Divorces: A Partial Solution Through
Federal Legislation, 1 OKLA. L. RJ>v. 151 (1948); Note, 17 GJ>o. WASH. L. RJ>v.
380 (1949); Rothenberg, Divorce Reform: The Question of Extra-Territorial
Recognition alld Proposals for a Uniform Law, 7 LAW. GUILD RJ>v. 218 (1947) ;
Wood, Principles of a Modern Uniform Divorce Law, 33 WOMJ>N LAW. J. 23
(1947) .
45 Note, 17 GJ>o. WASH. L. RJ>v. 380 (1949).
46 Comment, Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, 23 WASH. L. RJ>v. 259, n. 2
(1949) .
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nition act,47 approved in 1948 by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, had been adopted by seven states, as
of 1950.48 This latter act, designed to increase certainty in the migra-
tory-divorce field, is the only type of uniform divorce act that promises
to be widely adopted. Senator McCarran has sought to obtain certainty
in the migratory-divorce field by a proposed full-faith-and-credit stat-
ute that would protect migratory divorces.49
There is little chance that any kind of national divorce law will be
adopted. Constitutional amendments are difficult to put through, and
opposition from the conservative opponents of divorce and their oppo-
sites in the divorce-mill states probably will kill all efforts at Federal
divorce reform. The Supreme Court of the United States may yet solve
the problem of the uncertain effect of migratory divorce. Further case-
law developments on this question are indicated by the evolution that
has taken place in the full-faith-and-credit concept in relation to divorce
decrees since the first Williams Case.
Apart from full-faith-and-credit and conflict-of-laws problems, the
differences between states in their divorce laws should not cause con-
cern. After all, we do live under a federal system and there are impor-
tant regional differences in attitude toward divorce.
Not only has the law as to grounds for divorce been frequently criti-
cized, but so has the law of divorce defenses. It is argued that continua-
tion of recrimination, collusion, connivance, and condonation as de-
fenses is unrealistic and based on the undesirable standard of fault.50
Inroads on these defenses have been made by a group of cases holding
that, when the grounds are not based on fault (for example, the ground
of separation), the defenses based on fault do not apply.51 Refusal to
recognize recrimination as a defense has even been extended in a few
cases to situations in which the grounds are based on fault: conviction
of a felony involving moral turpitude ;52 incompatibility ;53 and "mis-
conduct, misbehavior, desertion, and general abandonment of the 'mar-
riage obligations."li4 There is also authority for overriding the defense
of recrimination by granting divorces to both spouses in the same suit if
47 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 367 (1951).
48 Id. at 364.
49 Note, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 385 (1949).
50 See, for example, Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Ap-
proach to the Problem, 36 A. B. A. J. 105 (1950), and Bradway, The Myth of the
Innocent Spouse, 11 TULANE L. REV. 377 (1937).
51 See cases cited in note 38 supra.
52 Vanderhuffv. Vanderhuff, 144 F. 2d 509 (D. C. Cir.1944).
53 Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N. M. 224, 174 P. 2d 826 (1946).
54 Stewartv. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d247 (1946).
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both have committed acts constituting grounds for divorce,55 and by
permitting a court in its discretion to award a divorce to one spouse
even if the spouses have been equally in the wrong.56 Recrimination has
also been weakened by the doctrine of comparative rectitude. Further
gradual erosion of the fault defenses by judicial decision is to be ex-
pected.
Changes in the laws of marriage have been recommended as one way
of preventing marital discord. Eliminate undesirable marriages and the
number of divorces will decline is the argument. Considerable progress
in marriage-law reform has been made in the past twenty-five years.
Revision has taken place in the requirements that must be met before
a couple can marry, in the types of marriages that are valid, and in the
class of persons who may perform marriage ceremonies. The increas-
ingly frequent pattern of the law as to age for marriage is to set a mini-
mum age for valid marriage and require parental consent for marriage
between the minimum age and the age of majority.57 Richmond and
Hall, who made a careful study of marriage laws during the twenties,
recommended that, because immaturity in mating is so serious a matter,
the minimum age for valid marriage be set at sixteen.58 In many states
the minimum age is below this. Richmond and Hall also recommend
that marriage-license laws require a five-day time interval between ap-
plication for and issuance of a license, application by both candidates,
verification of the candidates' qualifications by documentary evidence,
application by each candidate in his or her home county, and issuance of
licenses by the home county and the state of marriage if the marriage is
to take place outside the state of residence of one or both candidates.59
These requirements are designed to prevent illegal marriages and mar-
riage-market towns of the Gretna Green sort. Richmond and Hall do
not recommend mandatory publication of intention to marry which is
recommended by some. They feel that a verification requirement more
effectually accomplishes the objectives of publication.60 Most of the
Richmond.and Hall recommendations are now followed by some states.
Besides age restrictions for valid marriage, there are also health re-
strictions that indirectly act as preventives of marital discord by prohib-
iting bad marital risks from marrying. A common health restriction re-
55 Dillard v. Dillard, 197 Ga. 726, 30 S. E. 2d 621 (1944) ; Schirmer v. Schirmer,
84 Wash. 1, 145 Pac. 981 (1915); Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P. 2d 189
(1937).
56 Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kan. 65,173 Pac. 537 (1918).
57 E.g., O. C. L. A. sees. 63-101, 63-113, and 63-501 (1940).
58 RICHMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STAn 342 (1929).
59 Id. at 339.
60 Id. at 180.
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quires a medical certificate showing freedom from venereal disease as
a condition precedent to securing a marriage license.6l
Some states have restrictions prohibiting marriage by persons af-
flicted with tuberculosis or any other communicable disease. Oregon
requires a medical certificate of freedom from epilepsy, feeble-minded-
ness, insanity, drug addiction, and chronic alcoholism Defore a mar-
riage license can be issued.62 Statutes of this sort not only are difficult
to administer, but are phrased so broadly that, if enforced, they would
prevent some persons from marrying who should not be prohibited from
doing so. This is particularly true of certain types of epileptics.
An educational prerequisite to marriage has been seriously recom-
mended as a means of preventing marital discord and divorce. Judge J.
A. Sbarbaro of Chicago recommends that a marriage course be given by
the state. He believes that satisfactory completion of such a course with-
in sixty days prior to application for a marriage license should be re-
quired by law before a marriage license can be issued. The course would
consist of at least six lectures on these topics: economic adjustment to
marriage, the physical side of marriage, the "in-law" problem, basic in-
formation on rearing a family, the effects of divorce on children of
broken marriages, and the part of the school and the church in the
home.63
A group of restrictions on marriage that are of questionable value are
those applying to remarriage of divorced persons. Most American
states have some kind of remarriage prohibition applying to divorced
persons: interlocutory decrees, final decrees with marriage prohibited
for sixty days to two years, and prohibitibns against the guilty parties
in divorces for adultery remarrying during the lifetime of the innocent
parties.64 The American trend has been to repeal or make less severe
these remarriage restrictions.65 In 1946 the English remarriage restric-
tions were revised by reducing the waiting period between a decree nisi
and an absolute decree from six months to six weeks.66
Somewhat similar to the remarriage restrictions are time restrictions
on filing suit for divorce. These are designed as cooling-off periods in
which spouses will be deterred from seeking quick divorces without
adequate contemplation. Some of these restrictions are based on stat-
61 Or. Laws 1951, c. 362. And see Note, Eugenics in the Modern State: The
Saltiel Law, 32 ILL. L. REV. 327 (1937) ; Note, Virginia's Pre-Marital Blood Test
Act, 37 VA. L. REV. 339 (1951).
62 Or. Laws 1951, c. 362.
63 SBARBORO, MARRIAGE Is ON TRIAL 112 (1947).
64 The statutes are listed in Note, Statutory Restrictions on the Right to Re-
marry After Divorce-How They Are Avoided, 36 VA. L. REv. 665 (1950).
65 Ibid.
66 S. R. and Order 1946 (No. 1305). Commented on in 9 MOD. L. REV. 293
(1946).
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utes,6T some on the practices of judges. The refusal of many judges to
grant a divorce to couples married less than a year is an example of the
latter type. Statutes that require the lapse of a substantial time period
between filing a divorce suit and securing a decree of divorce have the
same cooling-off objective.6s
The suggested divorce-law reform that currently is receiving the
most attention is the adoption of the family court. The enthusiasm with
which family-court plans are now being received is due to dissatisfaction
with other reform efforts; the popularizing of psychiatry and spe-
cialized counseling; enthusiastic and effective advocacy by Judge Paul
W. Alexander and some of the other proponents of family courts; and
the fact that family courts are acceptable to both liberals and conserva-
tives on the question of divorce, apparently including those opposed to
divorce on religious grounds.69
The term "family court" is loosely applied to various types of courts
and proposed courts.TO It is sometimes considered synonomous with the
term "domestic-relations court." A family court, as the term is now
commonly used and as it is used in this article, has these distinguishing
characteristics: it is a court within the judicial system, presided over by
a judge; it has broad jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the family,
including the granting of divorces; and the judge has specialized assist-
ants on his staff to aid him in investigation and counseling.71
6T N. J. STAT. ANN. sec. 2 :50-2 (Supp. 1950). And see the proposed court rule in
Miner, Conciliation Rather than Reconciliation, 43 ILL. L. REV. 464, 471 (1948).
6S E.g., 90 days in Washington, WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 997-4 (Supp.
1949). •
69 For the reactions of Catholic leaders to the family-court idea, see Alexander,
Divorce Without Guilt or Sin, N. Y. TIMtS MAGAZINt (July 1, 1951) p. 14. Also
see Drinan, New Approach to Divorce Laws, SOCIAL ORDER (April 1949) p. 145.
TO For a discussion of the difficulties in defining a family court, see The Develop-
ment of Family Courts, 1924 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT. PROBATION ASS'N 169.
71 On family courts, see Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic
Approach to the Problem, 1949 U. OF ILL. 1. FOImM 695, reprinted in 36 A. B. A. J.
105 (1950) ; Alexander, New Procedures and Attitudes Suggested Toward Mar-
riage and Divorce, 32 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 38 (1948) ; Alexander, Divorce Without
Guilt or Sin, N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINt (July 1, 1951) p. 14; Alexander. Divorce-
Our National Horror, 19 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 322 (1951); Divorce and Children of
Divorce, 30 PORTLAND CITY CLUB BULL. 347 (1949); Divorce Laws: Remedies for
Abuses and Scandals Are Sought, 34 A. B. A. J. 195 (1948) ; Smith, Dishonest
Divorce, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 1947) p. 42; Ricks, Evolution of the Family
Court, 1924 PROCEEDINGS OF THt NAT. PROBATION ASS'N 19; Day, Development of
the Family Court, 136 ANNALS 105 (1928) ; Bradway, Family Dissolution-Limits
of the Present Litigious Method, 28 IOWA L. REV. 256 (1943) ; Seagle. Domestic
Relations Courts in 5 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 194 (1937) ; Waite, Courts of Domestic
Relations, 5 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1921) ; Perkins, Family COl/rts, 17 MICH. L. REV.
378 (1919); North, Milwaukee's Approach to Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Cases, 18 MARQ. L. Rtv. 241 (1934) ; North, The Family Court, 19 MARQ. L. Rtv.
174 (1935) ; Note, Domestic Relations Court of Cincinnati, 3 U. OF eIN. L. Rtv.
458 (1929) ; Entman, The Origins and Development of a Family Court, Domestic
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The family-court idea is not a new one. It developed as an outgrowth
of juvenile courts.72 The first juvenile court was established in 1899,
and today there are an estimated three thousand such courts. Every
state now has a juvenile-court act. In 1907, Oregon passed a Juvenile
Court Act applicable to all counties in the state.73 Juvenile courts deal
with delinquent and neglected children. Their purpose is to safeguard,
cure, rehabilitate, and correct the children that come before them, and
in so far as possible remedy the situations that caused the children tQ be-
come delinquent or neglected. Their procedure is informal; they are
frequently staffed with specialists in child care; and they work closely
with other institutions and organizations designed to give medical, psy-
chiatric, educational, and financial assistance to problem children. The
better juvenile courts avoid the penal outlook of adult criminal courts.
Lawyers from private practice infrequently appear in juvenile courts.
They are generally so uninformed on juvenile-court methods and juve-
nile-care facilities that they can perform no important' function in
delinquency cases. In most states, each juvenile court has jurisdiction
over only one county. But in several states, including Utah, there are
specialized judges who handle nothing bu~ juvenile-court cases, have
jurisdiction over a group of counties, and go on circuit to dispose of
cases.74
In 1914, Hamilton County (Cincinnati), Ohio set up the nation's
first family court, and assigned to it all divorce, alimony, desertion, non-
Relations Court-Family Division-New York City, 21 SOCIAL FORas 58 (1942) ;
FLEXNtR, OPPI>NHtIMtR, AND LtNROOT, THt CHILD, THt FAMILY, AND THt
COURT (U. S. Dep't of Labor, Children's Bureau Publication No. 193, 1933);
reports of the committees on family and domestic-relations courts, National Pro-
bation Association, in PRocttDlNGS of the association for the years 1920-1925;
Appleton, The New Family Courts of Japan, 30 Focus 85 (1951). Also see two
intensive studies of divorce courts: MARSHALL AND MAY, THt DIVORa COURT,
vo1.1 (Maryland) (1932); vo1.2 (Ohio) (1933).
72 On juvenile courts, see TAPPAN, JUVI>NILt DtLINQUI>NCY (1949) ; SUTHI;R-
LAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY c. 17 (4th ed. 1947) ; Chute, Fifty Years of the
Juvenile Court, 1949 YtARBOOK OF THt NAT. PROBATION AND PAROLt ASS'N 1;
SANDtRS, JuvtNILt COURTS IN NORTH CAROLINA (1948); HART, PRt¥tNTIVt
TRtATMtNT OF NtGLtCTtD CHILDRtN (1910); Lou, JUVI>NILt COURTS IN THt
UNITED STATtS (1927); Van Waters, Juvenile Delinquency and Juvenile Courts
in 8 ENCYc. Soc. SCI. 528 (1937); Draft for a Standard Juvenile Court Act, 1924
PROCEtDlNGS OF THt NAT. PROBATION ASS'N; Polier, The Standard Juvenile Court
Act, 1949, 1950 YEARBOOK OF Tut NAT. PROBATION AND PAROU ASS'N 9; Alex-
ander, Of Juvenile Court Justice and Judges, 1947 YEARBOOK OF Tut NAT. PROBA-
TION AND PAROLt ASS'N 187; Pound, The Juvenile Court in the Service State,
1949 YtARBOOK OF Tut NAT. PROBATION AND PAROLt ASS'N 21; Rubin, State
Juvenile Court: A New Standard, 30 Focus 103 (1951).
73 Or. Laws 1907, c. 34; O. C. L. A. sees. 93-601-93-620 (1940). The historical
background of the Oregon act is discussed in EAST, A HISTORY OF CoMMUNITY
INTtRtST IN A JuvtNILt COURT (1943), and EAST, THt GtNtSIS AND EARLY Dt-
VI>LOPMENT OF A JuvtNILt COURT (mimeographed, 1939).
74 UTAH CODE ANN. sec. 14-7-2 (Supp.1951).
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support, and Juvenile Court Act cases.711 Outside of Ohio, there are few
courts that have jurisdiction over both divorce and the conventional ju-
venile-court matters.
The various types of family matters that a family court could have
jurisdiction of are divorce, separation, annulment, juvenile delinquency,
nonsupport, neglect of a child, support of indigent parents, abuse of a
child, abandonment of a child, child-labor-act violations, selling liquor
to a child, harboring a runaway child, contributing to the delinquency
of a child, abandonment by one spouse of the other, assault and battery
by a spouse on other members of the family, bastardy, award of custody,
habeas corpus of a child, adoption, illegal placing for adoption, fixing
visitation rights, excluding a mate from the home, consent to marriage
by a child, and dependent and neglected children.76 Family-court pro-
ponents believe that all of these matters should be within the jurisdiction
of a family court.
In 1919, Oregon passed a Domestic Relations Court Act, applicable
only to Multnomah County, that established a new court with jurisdic-
tion over the following matters: dependent, delinquent, and neglected
children; contributing to the delinquency of minors; adoption and
change of name; commitment of mentally defective minors; and non-
support of a wife or children.77 A 1929 Oregon statute abolished this
court and transferred its jurisdiction, plus most divorce jurisdiction, to
a Department of Domestic Relations for the Circuit Court of Multno-
mah County.78 In 1951, a similar department with similar jurisdiction
was established for the Circuit Court of Marion County.79
In Multnomah County, Domestic Relations Department judges sit at
the Multnomah County Juvenile Home in juvenile cases. The new build-
ing now occupied by the Juvenile Home is a model of its kind.80 It is the
headquarters for the entire Juvenile Court staff, including fifteen case
workers and thirty group workers. It also has excellent living, educa-
tional, and recreational accommodations for one hundred children.
Many of the children involved in Juvenile Court Act proceedings are
kept at the home for a few days to a few weeks. During this time a care-
ful study is made of each case and a plan worked out for the child's fu-
75 Ricks, Evolution of the Family Court, 1924 PROCIlIlDINGS OF THIl NAT. PRO-
BATION ASS'N 19.
76 List prepared by Judge Paul W. Alexander, Court of Common Pleas, Divi-
sion of Domestic Relations, Lucas County (Toledo), Ohio.
77 Or. Laws 1919, c. 296; O. C. L. A. sees. 93-501-93-515 (1940) ; Kanzler,
The Court of Domestic Relations of the State of Oregon for the County of Multno-
mah, lOR. L. Rllv. 41 (1921).
78 Or. Laws 1929, c. 183.
79 Or. Laws 1951, e. 443.
80 The new building was obtained as a result of strong public support for it. See
Long, Developing Public Support for Juvenile Courts, 1947 YIlARBOOK OF THIl NAT.
PROBATION AND P ABor.1t ASS'N 260.
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ture care and training. There is close cooperation between the court and
other agencies, particularly the Portland Child Guidance Clinic, public
welfare, and the police.81 The personnel and facilities available for juve-
-nile cases in other parts of Oregon are much less adequate. For ex-
ample, the new Marion County domestic-relations judge has a total
staff of one secretary and three probation officers, and the juvenile-de-
tention faCilities are undesirable and inadequate.
One argument in favor of family courts is that they give a centralized
control over all matters pertaining to families. Some families have a
series of different problems arising from the same basic difficulties; for
example, nonsupport, child delinquency, and a request for a divorce.
With an integrated family court, the same staff deals with all of these
problems; there is thus a greater likelihood that a satisfactory solution
can be found without duplication of effort.
A judge is the chief administrative and judicial official of the family
court. This gives centralized authority and responsibility. If the volume
of cases is so great that more than one judicial officer is needed, some
courts use referees to hear matters, such as temporary alimony peti-
tions or juvenile cases; others appoint masters82 or commissioners ;88
and in Multnomah County, two judges are provided for the Domestic
Relations Department and the senior of the two assigns cases.84
The nonjudicial staff that the family-court proponents consider desir-
able is described by Judge Alexander as follows: .
[The juvenile court] is equipped with a staff of trained specialists. In the larger
courts it comprises the pediatrician, nurse, psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, psy-
chometrist, psychiatric caseworker, social caseworker (usually called probation
officer or counselor), marriage counselor, group worker, teacher, etc. In addition,
the court regularly invokes the services of the legal profession, the church, school,
private agency, public agency (police, recreation department, etc.) and all available
community and institutional resources. The family court we envision for marital
problems would be similarly staffed (except as to child specialists) and would
avail itself of the same outside resources.85
No court has a staff of this size or variety for use in divorce cases. A
few courts have small specialized staffs for investigation and counseling
purposes. Most courts, even in cities with a population of over 100,000,
have none. Few of the persons now working on divorce cases are trained
and skilled social workers, psychiatric social workers, marriage counse-
lors, psychiatrists, or psychologists. In Oregon there is only one such
81 For the relation of clinics to juvenile courts, see Relation of the Clinic to the
Delinquent Child, 1937 YEARBOOK OF THE NAT. PROBATION ASS'N 297.
82 Senate Bill No. 307, Ill. Laws 194,9. p. 730, declared unconstitutional in People
ex reI. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510,91 N. E. 2d 588 (1950).
83 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. sees. 997-34 and 997-35 (Supp. 1949).
84 Or. Laws 1951, c. 644.
85 Alexander, New Procedures and Attitudes Suggested Toward Marriage and
Divorce, 32]. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 38 (1948).
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person assigned to a court for work in divorce cases. The Domestic Re-
lations Department of the Multnomah County Circuit Court has a full-
time family consultant who conducts investigations and does counseling
in domestic-discord cases. The present family consultant is an experi-
enced psychiatric social worker. She works on three kinds of cases:
child custody, child-visitation rights, and voluntary requests for mar-
riage counseling. Her work on child-custody cases consists of an inten-
sive investigation of particularly difficult cases assigned to her by the
court. She submits written reports and recommendations to the court
after completion of the investigations. She also makes investigations and
holds conferences in some cases after a controversy has arisen over the
terms of or compliance with child-visitation provisions of divorce de-
crees. Usually the parties come to her voluntarily in these cases without
referral by the court. Many controversies are settled by agreement with-
out court action.
The family consultant's marriage-counseling work is done only in
marital-discord cases in which one or both spouses request her assist-
ance. Cases in which an attorney has been retained are not taken unless
the attorney requests it. This marriage-counseling service is rarely
granted after divorce proceedings have been started. Even though the
counseling service is comparatively unpublicized, there is greater de-
mand for it than can be met. Little time is spent on any cases except
those in which both spouses are desirous of saving their marriage. The
family consultant carries an average case load of twelve to fifteen of these
cases on a long-term therapy basis. In each case she confers with one or
both spouses on an average of once a week for from three to eighteen
months. In addition, group-therapy sessions are regularly held with six
to eight married couples selected from among those cases in which at
least one spouse is receiving individual therapy.86 Many requests for
marriage counseling are now turned down by the court family consult-
ant. Some are referred to provate psychiatrists. When the marriage-
counseling service of the new Portland family-service agency is opened,
the court family consultant will probably refer most counseling requests
to this agency.
Social workers are used by some divorce courts in Ohio to try to ef-.
feet reconciliations.87 They also do counseling and conduct investiga-
tions in nonsupport, custody, and child-visitation cases.88 Some courts
use probation officers, usually overworked and inadequately trained, as
marraige counselors, to make reconciliation attempts in divorce cases.
86 On this group-therapy program, see Drake and SuIlivan, Is Your Divorce
Necessary?, THE SUNDAY ORllGONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept. 2, 1951) p.6.
87 Fiedler, Social Services in a Divorce Court, 1948 YEARBOOK OF THE NAT.
PROBATION AND PAROLlt ASS'N 96.
8SI Ibid.
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This is being done in Washington under the new Family Court Act.89
In Detroit, a divorce-court official known as the "friend of the court"
claims to have had considerable success in reconciliation attempts. The
friend of the court also makes investigations in connection with support
and custody orders, and his office is the collection and disbursement cen-
ter for alimony and support payments.90 This office was set up in 1918
to enforce alimony decrees and the duties have gradually been increased.
Many Anglo-American courts have assistants to aid in uncovering
collusion and other defenses in divorce proceedings.91 In Oregon, this
function is supposed to be performed by the local district attorneys who
represent the state in all divorce cases and appear and defend in uncon-
tested divorce suits.92 In England and some American states, a court in-
vestigator or proctor makes independent investigations to discover pos-
sible divorce defenses.93 Investigative efforts of this nature have had
no material effect on the number of divorces filed or granted; and with
the growth of the family-court idea, they will probably be abandoned.
Family courts having extensive investigation and counseling services
to handle marital-discord cases can do something to increase family sta-
bility. They can also do a far better job of adjusting differences between
members of broken and discordant families than can the conventional
courts. Their advantage lies in broad jurisdiction, large skilled staffs,
and centralized control. But nowhere in the United States has the fam-
ily court been expanded to the point where anything close to its full po-
tential is realized.
Serious difficulties stand in the way of establishing effective family
courts. These difficulties may be so great as to make their general adop-
tion impossible, even in larger cities. It may be that those interested in
decreasing marital discord by group action would achieve more by leav-
ing the judicial system alone and directing their energies elsewhere.
One major difficulty in the way of establishing effective family courts
is their expense. Maintaining adequate investigative and counseling
staffs would be very costly, probably more costly than maintaining the
best present-day juvenile-court staffs. There is a question whether or
not local communities would be willing to bear this cost. The problem of
89 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. sees. 997-34 and 997-35 (Supp.1949).
90 Pokorny, "Friend of the Court" Aids Detroit Judges in Divorce Cases, 29
J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 166 (1946) ; Pokorny, Observations by a "Friend of the Court,"
10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 778 (1944) ; Pokorny, Practical Problems in the En-
forcement of Alimony Decrees, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 274 (1939) ; Cooper and
Dawson, Office of Friend of the Court, 6 DETROIT L. REV. 23 (1935).
91 2 VERNmR, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS sec. 80 (1932).
92 O. C. L. A. sec. 93-908 (1940).
93 Feinsinger, Divorce Law and Administration in England, 9 WIS. L. REV. 342,
369 (1934); 9 MOD. L. REv. 293 (1946).
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cost becomes especially acute in smaller cities and rural communities.
The circuit-riding family-court staff is a possible answer for these com-
munities.
Another difficulty is the nonexistence of sufficient personnel for even
a moderate expansion in family courts. Skilled investigators can be re-
cruited from the social-welfare profession. But there is no available sup-
ply of competent counselors. Drastic changes in university and other
training programs will be necessary if the number of such persons is to
be substantially increased.94 And then they will have to be shared by
many public and private organizations and by the private practice of
psychiatry and marriage counseling. Properly qualified family-court
judges also will be hard to find. More than a lawyer's training and ordi-
nary judicial experience is needed to properly preside over and admin-
ister a family court.
Opposition from the legal profession is likely to be another problem.
The private practitioner of law is of little significance in juvenile-court
matters. There are those who think that he should play even less of a
part in family courts. A Portland City Club committee has suggested
that family-counseling agencies might be permitted to represent liti-
gants in divorce proceedings without the intervention of a private attor-
ney.95 Even the Interprofessional Commission on Marriage and Divorce
Laws has "assumed" that the use of adversary procedures in divorce
cases should be displaced. If this assumption means anything, it means
that the basic approach of the private practitioner of law should be abol-
ished in divorce. It is inherent in his practice that he represent someone
against an actual or potential adversary whose interests differ from his
client's. If he cannot do this, there is no place for him in marital-discord
cases.
The idea of marriage counseling as a divorce-eourt function has been
criticized as coming so late in the history of the average marital contro-
versy as to be ineffectual. It is argued that, after one or both spouses
have decided on a divorce, and suit has been filed, counseling can achieve
nothing. Statistics on divorce dismissals challenge this argument for at
least a sizable minority of divorce cases.96 Also, the argument is based on
the theory that reconciliation is the only purpose of marriage counse1-
94 Present marriage-counselor training programs are discussed in Morgan,
Course Content of Theory Courses in Marriage Counseling, 12 MARRIAGe AND
FAMILY LIVING 95 (1950).
95 Divorce and Children of Divorce, 30 PORTLAND CITY CLUB BULL. 347, 354
(1949) .
96 A Los Angeles domestic-relations judge has had a favorable response to an
offer, made by him at the opening of his court each day, to assist in working out
reconciliations. Cunningham, Education--Conciliation in DIVORce AND DOMeSTIc
Rl>LATIONS 46 (1950), a compilation of the "Dicta" in VA. L. WeeKLY (1949-50).
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ing. Adjusting spouses to the fact of separation and divorce is perhaps as
important. Further, it should be realized that relatively few husbands or
wives having marital trouble seek marriage counseling before divorce.
This is true even in cities where good counseling services exist. One
reason may be ignorance of the available services. But another is an in-
clination to postpone any crisis-making decision concerning marital dis-
cord until the situation becomes so desperate that a divorce is decided
upon. Family-court counseling during divorce proceedings may be the
only possible place for counseling in many cases of discord. And family-
court counseling may be particularly effectiv~ because divorce usually
involves an emotional crisis to the parties; and this, together with the
formality and strain of the judicial proceedings, is conducive to suc-
cessful counseling.
Admittedly, many parties to divorce proceedings will not want to
have anything to do with a counseling service. This raises the question
of compulsory counseling. It would be cheaper and easier to restrict
family-court marriage counseling to cases in which one or both spouses
seem agreeable to it. But some experienced counselors claim that they
can make great headway with a large percentage of those spouses who
initially are very opposed to the counseling idea.
The issue of compulsory counseling also raises the moral question of
the right of the state to pry into the personality structures of parties in-
volved in litigation. Some will claim that the state has no such right.
These same people are likely to resist family courts as showing an un-
necessary and overly solicitous concern by the state with the affairs
of the individual.
The merit of consolidating juvenile-court and divorce jurisdiction in
one family court is questioned by some persons active in juvenile-court
work. They feel that this may be to the disadvantage of juvenile-court
programs by centering attention and personnel on the innumerable and
dramatic problems of divorce. Thus, opposition to family courts may
even come from within the court organization itself.
CONCLUSIONS AND ~COMMENDATIONS
A high divorce rate in the United States will continue indefinitely.
Large-volume divorce has become an established institution in Ameri-
can life.
The law has not been primarily responsible for the great increase in
divorce; it has merely reacted to more fundamental forces that have
produced a demand for divorce. Because of these forces, the legal system
is not going to be able to do much in the way of reducing and prevent-
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ing divorce. It can do something, it can probably do more than what it
is now doing, but at best its capacity is limited.
Too much attention is concentrated on the problem of divorce. The
basic problem is marital discord. More consideration should be given
to ways of preventing marital discord; but, on this problem as well, what
the legal system can do is very restricted.
Marital discord is a complex matter. There are many reasons for it;
and there are many ways in which interested groups, including the state,
can act so as to reduce the amount of such discord and its harmful re-
sults. The most effective way is by a coordinated program. The Ameri-
can Bar Association apparently realizes this and should be given great
credit for sponsoring a competently staffed interprofessional commis-
sion that is now studying marriage and divorce problems. The commis-
sion's membership has been drawn from the fields of law, religion, psy-
chology, sociology, marriage counseling, medicine, and psychiatry.97
When limited personnel and limited state and charitable funds are
available for dealing with marital-discord problems, they should be used
where they will do the most good. A coordinated program of action will
help greatly in deciding where this is.
The following steps are recommended for dealing with the problems
of marital discord and divorce. The recommendations are made in the
hope that they will contribute somewhat to current discussion by indi-
cating points at which attention should be focused, rather than with the
idea that they merit unquestioned adoption.
Divorce Grounds. The hypocrisy, misrepresentation, and perjury in
divorce proceedings should be eliminated, if possible. This means bring-
ing the law closer to the realities of existing divorce practice. Adultery
should never be the sole ground for divorce. Incompatibility, separation
for a fixed number of months or years, and separation for a fixed period,
plus agreement of the parties on a divorce, should be generally adopted
as legal grounds. The special hardship grounds of impotency, incurable
insanity, and conviction of a felony should also be generally adopted. As
a deterrent to taking marriage and divorce too lightly, there should be a
restriction on filing for divorce, except in the most unusual cases, until
the parties have been married for at least one year. A requirement of this
sort should be accompanied by steps to prevent evasion by abuse of an-
nulment laws.
Fault as an Element in Divorce. Fault should be eliminated from the
law so far as the issues of terminating the marriage and support and
97 Alexander, The Interprofessional Commission, id. at 119; and releases by the
commission.
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custody of minor children are concerned. Consideration should be given
to eliminating fault even on alimony and property-division issues, leav-
ing to the criminal law the function of punishing wrongful conduct by
one spouse against the other.
Divorce Proceedings. All divorce proceedings and court records
should be confidential until after a final decree is entered. Hearings in
divorce cases should be closed to the public. This would make it easier
for the court to obtain a full and accurate factual picture. It would also
make it easier to effect reconciliations after a suit has been filed, because
the starting of divorce litigation would be less of a final renunciation of
the marriage in the minds of the parties.
Custody oj Minor Children. In making custody awards in divorce
cases, courts should give more attention to the psychological well-being
of the children concerned. Awards are too frequently made to a neurotic
mother whose influence adversely affects her children's emotional devel-
opment. And parents' reprehensible conduct in matters not concerning
their children is too often a decisive consideration in granting custody.
Greater awareness of these dangers by judges is needed. More custody
investigations by qualified court staff members also would help.
M arriage.- The mental and physical restrictions on persons who may
marry should be revised in the light of present medical knowledge. The
minimum age for valid marriage should be no lower than sixteen. Re-
strictions on remarriage of persons who have been granted final di-
vorce decrees should be abolished after the time for appeal in the divorce
proceedings has passed. Marriage-license laws should be revised in ac-
cordance with the suggestions of Richmond and Hall. Fewer persons
should be qualified to perform civil marriages, and an effort should be
made to give civil-marriage ceremonies more dignity and grandeur.
Many persons are deeply impressed by elaborate ritual, and bringing
more of this to the civil ceremony will tend to make such persons take
marriage more seriously.
The Legal Profession. Too many able lawyers avoid divorce cases.
Efforts should be made to increase the number of proficient lawyers who
handle these matters. Closer surveillance of the bar in divorce matters,
especially in large cities, is also needed.
Juvenile and domestic cases require so much knowledge and skill of a
nonlegal sort that many judges are ill-equipped to handle them. There
is a need for training facilities that judges specializing in juvenile and
domestic matters can take advantage of. For example, a three-month
course tailored to the needs of these judges and given jointly by the law
and medical schools and the social-work, psychology, and sociology de-
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partments of some large American university would be valuable. Per-
manent careers as judges of juvenile and domestic-relations courts
should be encouraged. Young lawyers interested in this work should be
hired as probation officers and domestic-relations referees with the pos-
sibility of being advanced to the bench. The practice of rotating judges
for short periods of juvenile-court and divorce-court service should be
discouraged. If possible, full-time judges for juvenile, divorce, and fam-
ily courts should be selected from a panel of lawyers who are excep-
tionally qualified for service in these courts.
Lawyers who take divorce cases should familiarize themselves with
the marriage-counseling facilities in their communities. This would in-
clude becoming acquainted with the ministers, priests, physicians, psy-
chiatrists, psychiatric social workers, and professional marriage coun-
selors who are competent at marriage counseling. A lawyer can then in-
telligently refer a client with marital troubles to these counselors when
either the lawyer or the client questions the desirability of divorce in the
particular case or when divorce proceedings create dangerous anxieties
in the client. Local bar associations can assist by preparing lists of quali-
fied counselors and by developing and working with liaison committees
drawn from the groups having specialized counseling skills and inter-
ests.
If highly developed family courts are adopted, lawyers in private prac-
tice should be encouraged to represent clients involved in domestic-dis-
cord cases before these courts. The private practitioner is essential in
working out property adjustments in divorce cases and in enforcing
property orders and some support orders. On the issues of child cus-
tody and the termination of marriage, the lawyer in private practice also
has something to contribute. He is a protection against inadequate fac-
tual investigations or inaccurate reports by court investigators. His
presence increases the litigant's feeling of having had a fair hearing and
of not just having been arbitrarily processed by a government agency.
He is also a safeguard against misapplication of the law by the court.
Wherever an elaborately staffed family court is set up, lawyers might
increase their value and prevent their exclusion from domestic-relations
practice by establishing a specialized bar. Superior knowledge and abil-
ity would have to be shown before a lawyer could practice before a fam-
ily court.
Education. Law students should be given some training in observing
personality characteristics and motivations. They would then be equip-
ped to do a fairly good job of screening out those domestic-relations
clients who could profit by expert counseling, and of determining the
kind of counseling needed. Law-school courses in domestic relations and
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criminal law should cover the jurisdiction, structure, objectives, and
personnel of juvenile, domestic-relations, and family courts. These mat-
ters are now ignored in most law schools.
Courses in marriage and the family should be expanded in colleges
and high schools. These courses make for more stable future marriages
by supplying background information that can be used in adjusting to
marriage and by giving an impetus t~ more rational mate selection.
Marriage Counseling. Professional marriage counselors should be ex-
amined and licensed by the state. The sooner this is done, the less likeli-
hood that counseling quacks will get a foothold from which it will be
difficult to dislodge them. Efforts should be increased to obtain more
competent marriage counselors. The time may have arrived for the uni-
versities to start separate professional schools of counseling to supply
marriage, child-guidance, vocational-guidance, penal-institution, school,
and personnel-department counselors. This is another place where state
and charitable financial assistance would be valuable in an organized ap-
proach to problems of marital discord and divorce.
More funds should be made available to family-service agencies and
child-guidance clinics for marriage and family counseling. These agen-
cies deal with families during the formation and early development
stages. They are in an excellent position to prevent discord, which may
be much easier than to correct it after it has developed.
Family Courts. The extension of the family-eourt idea deserves care-
ful consideration. In part this means research. More study is needed of
family-court organization and methods, and of the means of getting such
courts established. Careful case studies should be made of the most
highly developed courts of domestic relations and family courts now in
existence.
One way of testing the merits of various plans would be to establish
eight or ten experimental courts in different types of communities, and
tryout new methods in these courts. Counties could be found willing to
cooperate if the courts were subsidized with outside funds. In return for
financing, the counties would agree to use the methods and the person-
nel recommended by some national organization, such as the interprofes-
sional commission, for supervising the experimental projects. Because of
the great concern over divorce, private-foundation or government finan-
cial support for such experiments could probably be obtained if the plans
were well thought through, were properly sponsored, and offered real
hope of progress.
Family courts, with adequately developed investigative and counsel-
ing services, are the most promising of the currently recommended di-
vorce reforms. They appear to be the best solution offered by the legal
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system to reduce marital discord when it becomes serious, and to effi-
ciently, fairly, and wisely terminate the marital status when this becomes
necessary. If properly staffed, they also should result in better custody
awards, measured by the well-being of the children involved, and more
equitable alimony and support orders. A few courts, such as the Court
of Domestic Relations in Toledo, Ohio, have begun to fulfill the promise
of the family-court idea. ,
But, as has been seen, there are serious problems to be overcome if
family courts are to be generally adopted. It is doubtful if this costly, in-
timate form of judicial administration can receive the degree of accept-
ance in all quarters necessary to widespread adoption. It is questionable
whether there are not other ways of expending money and skill that will
more effectively deal with marital-discord problems. It is debatable that
the legal system should be given more duties than it now has in the
family-relations sphere.
Some time must pass before these issues will be resolved. Family
courts are only in the early experimental stages. But they have enough
possibility of success to merit more extensive and genuine experimenta-
tion.
